Косвенные речевые акты в современном английском языке - Иностранные языки - Скачать бесплатно
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION…………….……………………………………….3
1. INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS: FORM VERSUS FUNCTION…………5
2. WHY DO SPEAKERS HAVE TO BE INDIRECT?…………………..7
2.1. The cooperative principle…………………………………………….7
2.2. The theory of politeness ……………………………………………...8
3. HOW DO HEARERS DISCOVER INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS
AND “DECIPHER” THEIR MEANING?…………………………….10
3.1. The inference theory………………………………………………...10
3.2. Indirect speech acts as idioms?…………………………………...…12
3.3. Other approaches to the problem……………………………………13
4. ILLOCUTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL UTTERANCES WITHIN A
DISCOURSE………………………………………………………….14
5.INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS IN ENGLISH AND UKRAINIAN……..16
5.
6.EXAMPLES OF INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS IN MODERN
ENGLISH DISCOURSE………..…………………………………….18
6.1. Fiction………………………………………………………………18
6.2. Publicism……………………………………………………………20
6.3. Advertising………………………………………………………….21
6.4. Anecdotes…………………………………………………………...21
7. INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS AS A YARDSTICK OF COMMUNI-
CATIVE MATURITY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING …..….23
CONCLUSIONS……….……………………………………………..25
РЕЗЮМЕ……………….…………………………………………….27
LITERATURE….…………………………………………………….28
INTRODUCTION
“A great deal can be said in the study of
language without studying speech acts,
but any such purely formal theory is
necessarily incomplete. It would be as if
baseball were studied only as a formal
system of rules and not as a game.”
John Rogers Searle
In the late 1950s, the Oxford philosopher John Austin gave
some lectures on how speakers “do things with words” and so
invented a theory of “speech acts” [10, 40] which now occupies
the central place in pragmatics (pragmatics is the study of how
we use language to communicate in a particular context). Austin
highlighted the initial contrast between the constative and the
performative. While constatives describe a state of affairs,
performatives (explicit and implicit) have the potential to bring
about a change in some state of affairs. Classical examples of
performatives include the naming of a ship, the joining of two
persons in marriage, and the sentencing of a criminal by an
authorised person. Austin distinguished between the locution of a
speech act (the words uttered), its illocution (the intention of
the speaker in making the utterance) and its perlocution (its
effects, intended or otherwise). Whereas constatives typically
have truth conditions to comply with, speech acts must satisfy
certain “felicity conditions” in order to count as an action:
there must be a conventional procedure; the circumstances and
people must be appropriate; the procedure must be executed
correctly and completely; often, the persons must have the
requisite thoughts, feelings, etc.
John Austin’s theory of speech acts was generalized to
cover all utterances by a student of Austin's, John Rogers Searle
[43, 69]. Searle showed that we perform speech acts every time we
speak. For example, asking “What's the time?” we are performing
the speech act of making a request. Turning an erstwhile
constative into an explicit performative looks like this: “It is
now ten o’clock” means “I hereby pronounce that it is ten o’
clock in the morning.”
In such a situation, the original constative versus
performative distinction becomes untenable: all speech is
performative. The important distinction is not between the
performative and the constative, but between the different kinds
of speech acts being performed, that is between direct and
indirect speech acts. Searle's hypothesis was that in indirect
speech acts, the speaker communicates the non-literal as well as
the literal meaning to the hearer. This new pragmatic trend was
named intentionalism because it takes into account the initial
intention of the speaker and its interpretation by the hearer.
Actuality of research:
The problem of indirect speech acts has got a great
theoretical meaning for analysis of the form/function relation in
language: the same form performs more than one function. To
generate an indirect speech act, the speaker has to use
qualitatively different types of knowledge, both linguistic and
extralinguistic (interactive and encyclopaedic), as well as the
ability to reason [45, 97]. A number of theories try to explain
why we make indirect speech acts and how we understand their non-
literal meaning, but the research is still far from being
complete.
The practical value of research lies in the fact that it is
impossible to reach a high level of linguistic competence without
understanding the nature of indirect speech acts and knowing
typical indirect speech acts of a particular language.
The tasks of research:
analysis of the theories on indirect speech acts;
finding out why interlocutors generate indirect speech acts
instead of saying exactly what they mean;
comparing typical indirect speech acts in English and in
Ukrainian;
providing examples of indirect speech acts in various
communicational situations.
The object of research is a speech act as a communicational
action that speakers perform by saying things in a certain way in
a certain context.
The subject of research is an indirect speech act as the
main way in which the semantic content of a sentence can fail to
determine the full force and content of the illocutionary act
being performed in using the sentence.
Methods of research include critical analysis of scientific
works on the subject, analysis of speech of native English
speakers in various communicational situations, analysis of
speech behavior of literary personages created by modern British
and American writers.
INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS: FORM VERSUS FUNCTION
“Communication is successful not when
hearers recognize the linguistic meaning of the
utterance, but when they infer the speaker's
meaning from it.”
Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson
Most of what human beings say is aimed at success of
perlocutionary acts, but because perlocutionary effects are
behavioural, cognitive, or emotional responses they are not
linguistic objects. What linguists can properly look at, however,
are the intentions of speakers to bring about certain
perlocutionary effects which are called illocutionary intentions.
The basis of a speech act is the speaker’s intention to
influence the hearer in a desired way. The intention can be
manifested and latent. According to O.G. Pocheptsov [13,74],
latent intentions cannot be linguistically analyzed while
manifested intentions can be divided into evident and inferable.
The illocutinary intention of indirect speech acts is inferable.
Three broad illocutionary categories are normally
identified – a statement, a question and a command/request -
having typical realisations in declarative, interrogative and
imperative verb forms. But sometimes the syntactic form of a
sentence is not a good guide to the act it is performing. In
indirect speech acts the agreement between the intended function
and the realised form breaks down, and the outward (locutionary)
form of an utterance does not correspond with the intended
illocutionary force of the speech act which it performs [37,
263]. In indirection a single utterance is the performance of one
illocutionary act by way of performing another. Indirect speech
acts have two illocutionary forces [45, 195].
Searle’s classical example of an indirect speech act is the
utterance “Can you pass the salt?” Without breaking any
linguistic norms we can regard it as a general question and give
a yes/no answer. But most often hearers interpret it as a
request. Likewise, the utterance “There's a fly in your soup”
may be a simple assertion but, in a context, a warning not to
drink the soup. The question “What's the time?” might, when one
is looking for an excuse to get rid of an unwelcome guest, be
intended as a suggestion that the guest should leave.
Analogously, the statement “I wouldn't do this if I were you” has
the congruent force of an imperative: “Don't do it!”
In his works Searle gives other interesting examples of
indirect speech acts: Why don’t you be quiet? It would be a good
idea if you gave me the money now. How many times have I told you
(must I tell you) not to eat with your fingers? I would
appreciate it if you could make less noise. In some contexts
these utterances combine two illocutionary forces and sound
idiomatic, even though they are not idioms in the proper sense of
the term. Each utterance contains an imperative (secondary
illocution) realized by means of a question or a statement
(primary illocution).
Paul Grice illustrates indirectness by the following
utterances [4, 22]: “There is a garage around the corner” used to
tell someone where to get petrol, and “Mr. X's command of English
is excellent, and his attendance has been regular”, giving the
high points in a letter of recommendation. A simple example of an
indirect speech act gives B.Russel: “When parents say ‘Puddle!’
to their child, what they mean is ‘Don’t step into it!’ [41,
195]. These are examples in which what is meant is not
determined by what is said.
We can make a request or give permission by way of making
a statement, e.g. by uttering “I am getting thirsty.” or “It
doesn't matter to me.” We can make a statement or give an order
by way of asking a question, such as “Will the sun rise
tomorrow?” or “Can you clean up your room?” When an illocutionary
act is performed indirectly, it is performed by way of performing
some other one directly.
It has been found that indirect expressives, directives and
representatives compose the most numerous group of indirect
speech acts [11, 23].
The study of indirect speech acts has mostly dealt with
requests in various guises. Jerrold M. Sadock identified some
exotic species: “whimperatives” - indirect requests in the form
of a question, e.g. “Can't you (please) do something?” and “Do
something, will you?”; “queclaratives” - the speaker directly
questions and indirectly makes an assertion: “Does anyone do A
any more?” meaning "Nobody does A any more"; “requestions” are
quiz questions to which the speaker knows the answer, e.g.
Columbus discovered America in ...? [42, 168].
Summarizing, we can say that indirection is the main way in
which the semantic content of a sentence can fail to determine
the full force and content of the illocutionary act being
performed in using the sentence.
WHY DO SPEAKERS HAVE TO BE INDIRECT?
“Everything that is worded too directly nowadays
runs
the risk of being socially condemned.”
Ye. Klyuev
2.1. The cooperative principle
An insight into indirectness is based on the
Cooperative Principle developed by Paul Grice [4, 14-76]:
language users tacitly agree to cooperate by making their
contributions to the conversation to further it in the desired
direction. Grice endeavoured to establish a set of general
principles explaining how language users convey indirect meanings
(so-called conversational implicatures, i.e. implicit meanings
which have to be inferred from what is being said explicitly, on
the basis of logical deduction). Adherence to this principle
entails that speakers simultaneously observe 4 maxims:
1) Maxim of Quality:
- Do not say what you believe to be false.
- Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
2) Maxim of Relevance:
- Be relevant.
3) Maxim of Quantity:
- Make your contribution as informative as required.
- Do not make your contribution more informative than
is required.
4) Maxim of Manner:
- Avoid obscurity of expression.
- Avoid ambiguity.
- Be brief.
- Be orderly.
This general description of the normal expectations we have
in conversations helps to explain a number of regular features in
the way people say things. For instance, the common expressions
"Well, to make a long story short" or "I won't bore you with the
details" indicate an awareness of the maxims of quantity and
manner. Because we assume that other speakers are following these
maxims, we often draw inferences based on this assumption.
At one level, cooperative behaviour between the
interactants means that the conversational maxims are being
followed; but at another and more important level, cooperative
behaviour still operates even if the conversational maxims are
apparently broken. For instance, when the speaker blatantly and
openly says something which appears to be irrelevant and
ambiguous (flouts the maxims of relevance and manner), it can be
assumed that s/he really intends to communicate something which
is relevant and unambiguous, but does so implicitly:
“ - I don't suppose you could manage tomorrow evening?
- How do you like to eat?
- Actually I rather enjoy cooking myself.” [J.
Fowles]
The second remark, instead of being a direct answer (a
statement), is a question formally not connected with the first
remark. The maxims of relevance and manner are flouted. The
inferable implicature is: “Yes, I can.”Analogously, the
implication of the third remark is inferred: “I invite you to
have dinner at my place.”
If we were forced to draw only logical inferences, life
would be a lot more difficult. Conversations would take longer
since we would have to say things which reasonable language-users
currently infer.
Searle adds one more conversational maxim [45, 126]: “Speak
idiomatically unless you have a reason not to.” He exemplifies
this maxim like this: if we say archaically “Knowest thou him who
calleth himself Richard Nixon?” (not idiomatically), the
utterance will not be perceived as a usual question “Do you know
Richard Nixon?”
An important difference between implicatures and what is
said directly is that the speaker can always renounce the
implicatures s/he hinted at. For example, in “Love and
friendship” by A.Lourie the protagonist answers to a lady asking
him to keep her secret: “A gentleman never talks of such things”.
Later the lady finds out that he did let out her secret, and the
protagonist justifies himself saying: “I never said I was a
gentleman.”
Implicatures put a question of insincerity and hypocrisy
people resort to by means of a language (it is not by chance that
George Orwell introduced the word “to double speak” in his novel
“1984”). No doubt, implicatures are always present in human
communication. V.Bogdanov notes that numerous implicatures
raise the speaker’s and the hearer’s status in each other’s eyes:
the speaker sounds intelligent and knowledgeable about the
nuances of communication, and the hearer realizes that the
speaker relies on his shrewdness. “Communication on the
implicature level is a prestigious type of verbal communication.
It is widely used by educated people: to understand
implicatures, the hearer must have a proper intellectual level.”
(Богданов 1990:21).
The ancient rhetorician Demetrius declared the following:
“People who understand what you do not literally say are not just
your audience. They are your witnesses, and well-wishing
witnesses at that. You gave them an occasion to show their wit,
and they think they are shrewd and quick-witted. But if you “chew
over” your every thought, your hearers will decide your opinion
of their intellect is rather low.” (Деметрий 1973:273).
2.2. The theory of politeness
Another line of explanation of indirectness is provided by
a sociolinguistic theory of politeness developed in the late
1970s. Its founder Geoffrey Leech introduced the politeness
principle: people should minimize the expression of impolite
beliefs and maximize the expression of polite beliefs [36, 102].
According to the politeness theory, speakers avoid threats to the
“face” of the hearers by various forms of indirectness, and
thereby “implicate” their meanings rather than assert them
directly. The politeness theory is based on the notion that
participants are rational beings with two kinds of “face wants”
connected with their public self-image [26, 215]:
• positive face - a desire to be appreciated and valued by
others; desire for approval;
• negative face - concern for certain personal rights and
freedoms, such as autonomy to choose actions, claims on
territory, and so on; desire to be unimpeded.
Some speech acts (“face threatening acts”) intrinsically
threaten the faces. Orders and requests, for instance, threaten
the negative face, whereas criticism and disagreement threaten
the positive face. The perpetrator therefore must either avoid
such acts altogether (which may be impossible for a host of
reasons, including concern for her/his own face) or find ways of
performing them with mitigating of their face threatening
effect. For example, an indirectly formulated request (a son to
his father) “Are you using the car tonight?” counts as a face-
respecting strategy because it leaves room for father to refuse
by saying “Sorry, it has already been taken (rather than the face-
threatening “You may not use it”). In that sense, the speaker’s
and the hearer’s faces are being attended to.
Therefore, politeness is a relative notion not only in its
qualitative aspect (what is considered to be polite), but in its
quantitative aspect as well (to what degree various language
constructions realize the politeness principle). Of course there
are absolute markers of politeness, e.g. “please”, but they are
not numerous. Most of language units gain a certain degree of
politeness in a context.
3. HOW DO HEARERS DISCOVER INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS AND
“DECIPHER” THEIR MEANING?
It has been pointed out above that in indirect speech acts
the relationship between the words being uttered and the
illocutionary force is often oblique. For example, the sentence
“This is a pig sty” might be used nonliterally to state that a
certain room is messy and filthy and, further, to demand
indirectly that it be cleaned up. Even when this sentence is used
literally and directly, say to describe a certain area of a
barnyard, the content of its utterance is not fully determined by
its linguistic meaning - in particular, the meaning of the word
“this” does not determine which area is being referred to.
How do we manage to define the illocution of an utterance
if we cannot do that by its syntactic form? There are several
theories trying to answer this question.
The inference theory
The basic steps in the inference of an indirect speech act
are as follows [37, 286-340]:
I. The literal meaning and force of the utterance are computed
by, and available to, the participants. The key to
understanding of the literal meaning is the syntactical
form of the utterance.
II. There is some indication that the literal meaning is
inadequate (“a trigger” of an indirect speech act).
According to Searle, in indirect speech acts the speaker
performs one illocutionary act but intends the hearer to infer
another illocution by relying on their mutually shared background
information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, as well as on
general powers of rationality and inference, that is on
illocutionary force indicating devices [43, 73]. The
illocutionary point of an utterance can be discovered by an
inferential process that attends to the speaker's prosody, the
context of utterance, the form of the sentence, the tense and
mood of verbs, knowledge of the language itself and of
conversational conventions, and general encyclopaedic knowledge.
The speaker knows this and speaks accordingly, aware that the
hearer - as a competent social being and language user - will
recognize the implications [32, 41]. So, indirectness relies on
conversational implicature: there is overwhelming evidence that
speakers expect hearers to draw inferences from everything that
is uttered. It follows that the hearer will begin the
inferential process immediately on being presented with the
locution. Under the cooperative principle, there is a convention
that the speaker has some purpose for choosing this very
utterance in this particular context instead of maintaining
silence or generating another utterance. The hearer tries to
guess this purpose, and in doing so, considers the context,
beliefs about normal behaviour in this context, beliefs about the
speaker, and the presumed common ground.
The fact that divergence between the form and the contents
of an utterance can vary within certain limits helps to discover
indirect speech acts: an order can be disguised as a request, a
piece of advice or a question, but it is much less probable as a
compliment.
III. There are principles that allow us to derive the
relevant indirect force from the literal meaning and the context.
Searle suggests that these principles can be stated within
his theory of felicity conditions for speech acts [44, 38].
For example, according to Searle’s theory, a command or a
request has the following felicity conditions:
1. Asking or stating the preparatory condition:
Can you pass the salt? The hearer's ability to perform an
action is being asked.
Literally it is a question; non-literally it is a request.
2. Asking or stating the propositional content:
You're standing on my foot. Would you kindly get off my
foot?
Literally it is a statement or a question; non-literally it
is a request.
3. Stating the sincerity condition:
I'd like you to do this for me.
Literally it is a statement; non-literally it is a request.
4. Stating or asking the good/overriding reasons for doing
an
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